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Abstract 
Decision-making competence is the ability to follow normative principles when making 
decisions. In a longitudinal analysis, we examine the robustness of decision-making competence 
over time, as measured by two batteries of paper-and-pencil tasks. Participants completed the 
youth version (Y-DMC) at age 19 and/or the adult version (A-DMC) eleven years later at age 30, 
as part of a larger longitudinal study. Both measures are comprised of tasks adapted from ones 
used in experimental studies of decision-making skills. Results supported the robustness of these 
measures and the usefulness of the construct. Response patterns for Y-DMC were similar to 
those observed with a smaller initial sample drawn from the same population. Response patterns 
for A-DMC were similar to those observed with an earlier community sample. Y-DMC and A-
DMC were significantly correlated, for participants who completed both measures, 11 years 
apart, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability. Nomological validity was 
observed in correlations of scores on both tests with measures of cognitive ability, cognitive 
style, and environmental factors with predicted relationships to decision-making competence, 
including household SES, neighborhood disadvantage, and paternal substance abuse. Higher Y-
DMC and A-DMC scores were also associated with lower rates of potentially risky and 
antisocial behaviors, including adolescent delinquency, cannabis use, and early sexual behavior. 
Thus, the Y-DMC and A-DMC measures appear to capture a relatively stable, measurable 
construct that increases with supportive environmental factors and is associated with constructive 
behaviors. 
 
Key words: Decision-making competence, adolescents, life span, individual differences 
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Robustness of Decision-Making Competence: Evidence from two measures and an 11-year 
longitudinal study  
Day-to-day, we make decisions that range from the relatively trivial to ones with major 
effects on our lives. Traditionally, normative theories of decision making have posited how 
people should make decisions that maximize the expected utility of their outcomes (e.g., 
Bernoulli, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953; Simon, 1978). Descriptive research in 
behavioral decision making has long focused on identifying when and why individuals 
systematically deviate from the principles posited by traditional normative theories, and on the 
efficiency of the heuristic strategies that sometimes replace them (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1981; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). For example, people may 
violate the normative µVXQNFRVW¶SULQFLSOe by continuing to invest in unprofitable options, 
especially when they have made large unrecoverable investments (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). 
People may also violate the traditional normative principle of µdescription invariance¶as when 
they rate a team as more successful when described in terms of its 60% success rate rather than 
its 40% failure rate (Dunegan, 1993), perhaps reflecting conversational norms that prescribe 
using success rates to describe successful teams and failure rates to describe failing ones (Sher & 
McKenzie, 2006).  
As a result of its focus on understanding how individual violations occur, the field long 
left open the question of whether there are stable individual differences in the ability to avoid 
such violations, across time and contexts. Such decision-making competence (DMC) would be 
similar to, but distinct from, other cognitive abilities such as IQ or executive cognitive function 
(e.g., Stanovich & West, 1998, 2008; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008).  
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Suggestively, studies that used multiple items to measure adherence to a given normative 
principle have found relative internal consistency for SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ability to resist violations of 
the sunk cost principle (Stanovich, 1999), resist framing effects that violate description 
invariance (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002), apply decision rules consistently 
(Bröder, 2000), and express appropriate confidence in their knowledge (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 
1999; Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Stankov & Crawford, 1996, 1997; West 
& Stanovich, 1997; Wolfe & Grosch, 1990). As with most experimental research, these studies 
UHSRUWOLWWOHHOVHDERXWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶WUDLWVEHKDYLRUVDQGOLIHFLUFXPVWDQFHV7KHRQe exception is 
that several studies that have also measured cognitive ability, typically finding it to be positively 
correlated with performance on decision-making tasks, such as ones testing resistance to sunk 
costs (Larrick, Nisbett, & Morgan, 1993), resistance to framing (Smith & Levin, 1996), and 
under/overconfidence (Stanovich & West, 2000; Wolfe & Grosch, 1990).  
Twenty years ago, we received an unusual opportunity to examine the validity of tasks 
used in behavioral decision research. We administered a battery of seven such tasks to 110 
males, at the age-19 assessment of a longitudinal study conducted by the Center for Education 
and Drug Abuse Research (CEDAR; Tarter & Vanyukov, 2001). As described below, CEDAR 
provided a wealth of other measures, including ones with predicted relationships with decision-
making competence. Results from our initial study suggested individual differences in 
performance that are correlated across behavioral decision-making tasks, as reflected in the 
primary factor of an exploratory factor analysis across task scores (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). 
These scores (called Y-DMC, for Youth Decision-Making Competence) were related to other 
theoretically postulated measures, such as maladaptive risk-taking behavior and supportive home 
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environment, even after controlling for two measures of cognitive ability (Parker & Fischhoff, 
2005).  
In order to expand that initial study, we developed an adult version of Y-DMC, called A-
DMC, with items suited to a general adult population, and improving some elements of Y-DMC 
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Parker, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2015). 
Administration of A-DMC to a diverse community sample of adults revealed patterns similar to 
those in the initial Y-DMC study. Performance on the tasks was positively correlated, yielding a 
common factor in an exploratory factor analysis (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Moreover, the 
overall A-DMC score predicted life experiences, as reported on a Decision Outcome Inventory 
(DOI) developed in the study, even after controlling for measures of cognitive ability (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2007). Thus, Y-DMC and A-DMC are measures of decision-making competence 
that appear to demonstrate three key aspects of construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; 
Messick, 1989; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Namely, the tasks (a) span a theoretical domain, 
focusing on skills identified in behavioral decision research as ones that would indicate decision 
quality; (b) have structural validity, revealed in the correlations between performance on the 
constituent tasks; and (c) reveal convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity.  
In the ensuing period, CEDAR continued to administer Y-DMC to participants, as part of 
its age-19 assessment, adding 416 individuals to our original sample of 110. It also administered 
A-DMC to 214 individuals completing their final CEDAR assessment at age 30, including 146 
who had completed Y-DMC eleven years earlier. The next section summarizes the original Y-
DMC and A-DMC studies, followed by the new data and analyses. 
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Original studies 
The Center for Education and Drug Abuse Research (CEDAR; Tarter & Vanyukov, 
2001) enrolled high-risk youth (defined as having fathers who met clinical diagnostic criteria for 
substance use disorder) and low-risk youth (defined as having fathers with no diagnosed 
substance use disorder), at age 9-13, with the aim of following them until age 30. The initial 
CEDAR sample recruited only males, adding females in subsequent years. Participants 
underwent periodic intensive assessments. At the age-19 assessment, 110 of the initial male 
CEDAR sample completed a battery of seven tasks adapted from the behavioral decision 
research literature, chosen to capture key decision-making skills, and formulated to reduce 
shared method variance (Table 1).1  
As reported more fully in Parker & Fischhoff (2005), performance was correlated across 
tasks, revealed a strong first factor in an exploratory factor analysis, and showed good test-retest 
reliability on a subsample of participants who completed the materials twice. Scores on the 
common factor, called Y-DMC, were positively correlated with measures of both fluid and 
crystallized intelligence (Cattell, 1987; Horn, 1985). They were also correlated with other 
measures relevant to the decision-making competence construct, even after controlling for 
cognitive ability, suggesting a distinct construct. More specifically, semi-partial correlations that 
controlled for the two measures of cognitive ability found that individuals with higher Y-DMC 
scores also reported less polarized thinking, more constructive behavioral coping strategies 
(Epstein & Meier, 1989; Katz & Epstein, 1991), and greater self-monitoring (suggesting greater 
cognitive flexibility; Graziano et al., 1987; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Cantor, 1980). Semi-partial 
correlations with the same controls found that individuals with higher Y-DMC scores reported 
fewer risky and antisocial behaviors2 suggestive of poor decision making, such as externalizing 
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and delinquent behavior, cannabis use, and early sexual activity. Finally, semi-partial 
correlations found that individuals with higher Y-DMC scores had better family and social 
environments, in ways that should promote the development of decision-making skills.  
As reported more fully in Bruine de Bruin, Parker, and Fischhoff (2007), the Adult 
Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) measure adapted the Y-DMC tasks to be more suitable 
for adults and their life experiences. As with Y-DMC, A-DMC task scores were significantly 
correlated with one another, and their composite score was positively correlated with a measure 
of fluid intelligence. Holding age, SES, and cognitive ability constant, individuals with higher A-
DMC scores reported fewer negative life outcomes (e.g., foreclosure, getting kicked out of an 
apartment) on the Decision Outcome Inventory (see also Parker et al., 2015).  
Subsequent research has found further support for the validity of the Y-DMC and A-
DMC measures. Higher Y-DMC scores have been associated with greater ability to make 
choices consistent with maximizing expected value (Parker & Weller, 2015) and with fewer 
emotional, behavioral, and peer-related difficulties, reported two years after assessment (Weller, 
Moholy, Bossard, & Levin, 2014). Studies have also found better performance on A-DMC tasks 
to be associated with higher scores on tests of cognitive abilities (e.g., Del Missier et al., 2013, 
2015; Frederick, 2005) and self-reports of theoretically productive decision-making styles (e.g., 
Carnevale, Inbar & Lerner, 2012; Dewberry, Juanchich & Narendran, 2013; Parker, Bruine de 
Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007). One study found that individuals with higher A-DMC scores reported 
seeing less expected value in various risk behaviors and engaging in fewer of them (Weller, 
Ceschi, & Randolph, 2015). A-DMC has been used to assess the decision-making competence of 
US policy leaders (Carnevale et al., 2012), Swedish adults with ADHD (Mäntylä, Still, Gullberg 
& DelMissier, 2012), US psychiatric patients at risk for suicide (Szanto et al., 2015), Slovak 
Decision-making competence  8 
students (Bavolar, 2013), and US students in high school history classes with and without a focus 
on decision making (Jacobson et al., 2012).  
The current study 
The new CEDAR data allow further analyses of the psychometric properties of the Y-
DMC and A-DMC measures used in the original studies, and of the decision-making competence 
construct that they assess (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). These new 
data also provide a first examination of how stable the construct is over time, for participants 
who completed the closely related measures at the age-19 and age-30 assessments. Several 
studies have used cross-sectional designs to assess decision-making competence in individuals at 
various life stages (e.g., Bruine de Bruine, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012; Finucane & Gullion, 2010; 
Weller, Levin, Rose, & Bossard, 2012). However, such designs confound age groups and 
cohorts. CEDAR¶VORQJLWXGLQDOdesign allowed us to follow individuals as they aged through a 
formative developmental period.  
Thus, we had three main research aims: 
Aim 1: Assess the internal validity of Y-DMC and A-DMC, as revealed in the 
relationships among scores on their component tasks. 
Aim 2: Assess the nomological validity of Y-DMC and A-DMC, in terms of whether 
they correlate in expected ways with constructs reflecting participaQWV¶(a) general cognitive 
abilities, (b) social environments, (c) cognitive styles, and (d) risk behaviors. 
Aim 3: Assess the stability of decision-making competence over time and across 
assessment tools, in terms of the relationship between age-19 Y-DMC and age-30 A-DMC, 
controlling for cognitive ability.  
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Aims 1 and 2 expand results from prior work (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & 
Fischhoff, 2005) to new samples, providing context for our novel longitudinal analyses. Aim 3 
examines the stability of relationships across an 11-year age span, and across two related 
instruments. 
Method 
Longitudinal data collection 
The Center for Education and Drug Abuse Research (CEDAR) conducted a longitudinal 
study examining the etiology of substance abuse (Tarter & Vanyukov, 2001). Beginning in 1989, 
it recruited 9-13 year-olds (M = 11.4, SD = 0.9) at high or low risk for developing substance-use 
disorders, defined by whether a participant¶s father had a history of substance-use disorders. 
High-risk youth were identified through clinical settings, advertising, and a marketing firm; low-
risk youth were drawn through random-digit dialing and advertising. The initial baseline 
assessment included WKHFKLOGDQGWKHFKLOG¶VSDUHQWVDQGcovered domains such as health 
behavior, psychopathology, cognitive functioning, and family and social environment. 
Subsequent assessments were conducted every 2-3 years through age 30.3 In 1998, CEDAR 
added Y-DMC to the age-19 assessment; in 2007, CEDAR added A-DMC to the age-30 
assessment. The National Institute of Drug Abuse discontinued funding CEDAR in 2015. As a 
result, although most CEDAR participants completed Y-DMC, not all completed (or will ever 
complete) A-DMC.   
Y-DMC and A-DMC samples 
 Our study involved the three CEDAR samples (Table 2): First, the Y-DMC initial sample 
(N=108)4 included male youth who completed Y-DMC at age 19, as reported in Parker and 
Fischhoff (2005). Second, the Y-DMC expansion sample (N=416) included male and female 
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youth who completed the age-19 Y-DMC assessment at later times, whose data have not been 
published previously. Third, the A-DMC sample (N=214) included participants who completed 
A-DMC at age 30; among them, 146 (73.4%) had also completed Y-DMC at age 19 (the others 
had completed the age-19 assessment before the initial Y-DMC data collection began). 
Lngitudinal analyses reported here involve those 146 participants. A-DMC scores were similar 
for participants with and without Y-DMC scores, t(212)=.91, ns.; Y-DMC scores were similar 
for participants with and without A-DMC score, t(522)=-1.51, ns. 
The Y-DMC expansion sample included female participants (44%), who had not been 
recruited in &('$5¶V early stages. The Y-DMC expansion sample was somewhat less 
Caucasian (71.1%) than the Y-DMC initial sample (86.1%), Ȥ2(1)=7.75, p<.05, r=.12, slightly 
older at the age-19 assessment (mean 18.9 vs. 18.6 years), t(513)=7.13, p<.001, d=.77, more 
likely to have graduated high school or received a GED by the age-19 assessment (81.6% vs. 
56.1%, partly reflecting the older mean age), Ȥ2(1)=30.4, p<.001, r=.24, but no more likely to 
have graduated high school or received a GED by the age-30 assessment (96.6% vs. 95.8%), 
Ȥ2(1)=.07, ns., r=.01. There were no differences between the two samples in their age at the age-
30 assessment, likelihood of having a EDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHE\DJHRU membership in the low-
risk vs. high-risk group for developing substance use disorders (p>.05).  
In the analyses that follow, we focus on the new data, in the Y-DMC expansion sample 
and the age-30 sample, considering the Y-DMC initial and combined samples (including both 
initial and expansion samples) for context when helpful.  
Both Y-DMC and A-DMC included six tasks assessing the ability to follow normative 
principles of decision making (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). They are 
publicly available for download from the Society for Judgment and Decision Making 
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(http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Youth_-_Decision_Making_Competence.html; 
http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Adult_-_Decision_Making_Competence.html). Below, we briefly 
describe each task and its scoring. Further detail can be found in the original papers (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) and online supplementary material. 
 Resistance to Framing measured whether participants valued options similarly despite 
normatively irrelevant variations in their descriptions. As such, items were paired, with each 
representing an equivalent choice presented differently. Participants received both items in each 
pair, separated by other tasks. Y-DMC included five pairs of binary-choice items, with the 
overall Resistance to Framing score reflecting the number of consistent choices (0-5). Two of the 
five item pairs represent valence-framing problems, where the same outcomes or attributes are 
framed positively or negatively (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). The other three represent 
non-valence frames. Cronbach's alpha is low in the Y-DMC expansion sample Į .19), as it was 
in the Y-DMC initial sample Į .30; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).  
Suspecting that the diverse forms of framing in the Y-DMC set were sampling more than 
one domain, we designed A-DMC to use only valence framing problems.5 We also increased the 
number of pairs from five (Y-DMC) to fourteen (A-DMC) and changed from a discrete choice 
response mode to a six-point rating scale, hoping to discriminate better among preferences. That 
scale was anchored at 1=definitely would choose A and 6=definitely would choose B. The 
Resistance to Framing score was one minus the mean absolute difference in ratings on the 
fourteen question pairs. Cronbach¶V alpha for A-DMC was much higher Į .70) than for Y-
DMC, presumably reflecting these changes and similar to results with the A-DMC community 
sample (Į .62; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
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 Resistance to Sunk Cost measured how well participants follow the normative 
prescription to ignore unrecoverable past expenditures when making decisions (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985). Y-DMC was scored as the number of choices, across two items, that resisted sunk cost. 
Cronbach¶V alpha was very low in the Y-DMC expansion sample Į .13), as it had been in the 
Y-DMC initial sample Į .03; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). A-DMC expanded this scale, using ten 
items instead of two. Additionally, the latter scale implemented a 6-point rating scale to assess 
how likely respondents were to choose the sunk-cost (versus normatively correct) option. 
Presumably reflecting those changes, Cronbach¶V alpha improved but remained lower than 
typically sought for scales Į .55), replicating previous findings Į .54 in the A-DMC 
community sample; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
 Applying Decision Rules asked participants to indicate which option to select from a 
choice set, using decision rules from Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993). For example, one A-
DMC item states that, ³/LVDZDQWVWKHBlu-ray player with the highest average rating across 
features,´and provides ratings of each option on features such as picture quality, sound quality, 
and programming options. A-DMC differed from Y-DMC by having more items (ten vs. seven), 
more options per item (five vs. three), an updated cover story (Blu-ray players vs. Walkmen), 
and numeric rather than graphical rating displays. The overall score reflected the percent of items 
for which the choice followed the decision rule. Cronbach¶V alpha was .58 for the Y-DMC 
expansion sample (Į .68 for the Y-DMC initial sample; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) and .67 for 
the A-DMC sample (Į .73 for the A-DMC community sample; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
 Under/overconfidence assessed how well participants assess the extent of their own 
knowledge. For each of 42 statements for Y-DMC and 34 for A-DMC, participants indicated 
whether it was true or false, and then assessed their confidence in their answer, on a scale 
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anchored at 50% (just guessing) and 100% (absolutely sure). Y-DMC items covered topics 
relevant to adolescents, including (a) general knowledge (e.g., history, geography), (b) the effects 
of alcohol and drugs, and (c) potential consequences of risky sexual behavior and HIV/AIDS 
transmission. A-DMC items included WRSLFVWDNHQIURPDGYLFHERRNVWDUJHWLQJDGXOWV¶OLIH
decisions (e.g., finances, health). The overall Under/overconfidence score equaled one minus the 
absolute difference between mean confidence and percentage correct, so that higher scores 
reflected better performance. Cronbach¶V alpha was .76 for the Y-DMC expansion sample (Į .79 
for the Y-DMC initial sample; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) and .80 for the A-DMC sample (Į .77 
for the A-DMC community sample; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
 Consistency in Risk Perception measureGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ ability to follow the normative 
rules of probability theory when assessing risks. Each item asked participants to judge the 
probability of an event occurring on a linear scale ranging from 0% (=no chance) to 100% 
(=certainty). Item pairs included nested subset and superset events, complementary events, 
conjunctions of two events, and disjunctions of two events. A-DMC had more items than Y-
DMC (twenty vs. five). Scores reflected the percentage of item pairs assigned consistent 
probabilities. Cronbach¶V alpha was.45 for the Y-DMC expansion sample (Į .50 for the Y-DMC 
initial sample; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) and .65 for the A-DMC sample (Į .72 for the A-DMC 
community sample; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
 Recognizing Social Norms measured how well participants assess peer social norms, 
following previous measures (Jacobs, Greenwald, & Osgood, 1995; Loeber, 1989), and is the 
same for Y-DMC and A-DMC. Participants indicated KRZPDQ\³RXWRISHRSOH\RXUDJH´
ZRXOGDJUHHWKDW³LWLVVRPHWLPHV2.´WRHQJDJHLQHDFKRIXQGHVLUDEOHEHKDYLRUVHJWR
steal under certain circumstances). After completing other tasks, participants indicated whether 
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they thought that ³LWLVVRPHWLPHV2.´WRengage in each behavior. The score for each 
participant was the rank-order correlation (from -1 to 1) between the estimated and actual 
percentage of endorsers in the sample, as computed across the 16 behaviors. Cronbach¶V alpha 
was .68 for the Y-DMC expansion sample (Į .40 for the Y-DMC initial sample; not previously 
reported) and .57 for the A-DMC sample (Į .64 for the A-DMC community sample; Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2007).  
 Overall score. For both Y-DMC and A-DMC, the overall score reflected the mean of the 
six task scores, after standardizing each with z transformations. This algorithm was used by 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), but differed from Parker & Fischhoff (2005), who extracted a 
factor score from a principal components analysis (i.e., creating a weighted average). Y-DMC 
scores were largely unaffected by this change in computation, with the two calculations 
correlated at r = .93 (p<.001) in the Y-DMC combined sample. We used the procedure proposed 
by Nunnally and Berstein (1994, pp. 266-274) to estimate the internal consistency of composite 
scores, which recognizes that linear combinations of loosely-correlated measures can have 
greater reliability than the original measures (much as a summative scale is more reliable with 
more items). This estimate was computed as an average of the task alphas weighted by factor 
scores from a principal components analysis. For the DMC composite measure, this estimate of 
alpha was .77 for the Y-DMC expansion sample (YVĮ .76 in the Y-DMC initial sample; Parker 
& Fischhoff, 2005), with a mean inter-item correlation of .13, and .81 for the A-DMC sample 
(YVĮ .83 in the A-DMC community sample; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007), with a mean inter-
item correlation of .15.  
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Covariates 
We drew on the large CEDAR database to establish the nomological validity of the Y-
DMC and A-DMC assessments. We report all covariates reported in Parker and Fischhoff 
(2005), along with several substitutions chosen to improve comparisons, as noted below. The 
ages at which each covariate was assessed appear as footnotes to Table 4. 
 Cognitive ability. Following Parker & Fischhoff (2005), we used the vocabulary 
assessment of Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Revised (WISC-R; Wechsler, 1972) as 
a measure of crystallized cognitive ability. Fluid cognitive ability was represented by executive 
cognitive functioning (ECF), assessed by combining the block design test from the WISC-R with 
other measures of inhibition and executive functioning, including the Porteus maze, vigilance, 
motor restraint, and forbidden toy tasks (see Giancola and Parker, 2001, for details).    
 Social and family influences. We used five measures related to conditions that should 
foster the development of decision-making abilities (Parrill-Burnstein, 1978; Baron & Hershey, 
1988; Jones et al., 1997): (a) whether WKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VIDWKHUKDGDKLVWRU\RIVXEVWDQFHXVH
disorders; (b) household socio-economic status (Hollingshead, 1975); (c) neighborhood 
disadvantage, defined by Census estimates of the percentage of households below the poverty 
level, the percentage of households headed by females, the percentage of adults over age 24 
without college degrees, and the percentage of households not occupied by owner (following 
Ridenour et al., 2009); (d) social support, as assessed by the Interpersonal Support Evaluation 
List (ISEL) (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983); (e) peer environment, including SHHUV¶SUREOHP
behavior (e.g., drug or alcohol use) and constructive behavior (e.g., participation in school clubs 
and athletics; Tarter, 1991).  
Decision-making competence  16 
 Cognitive style. As in Parker & Fischhoff (2005), we considered four measures of self-
reported cognitive style. Two are from the Constructive Thinking Inventory (Epstein & Meier, 
1989; Katz & Epstein, 1991): Polarized Thinking, which assesses difficulty with seeing nuances 
in situations HJ³,WHQGWRFODVVLI\SHRSOHDVHLWKHUIRUPHRUDJDLQVWPH´), and Behavioral 
Coping, which captures behavioral strategies for coping with adversity HJ³,DPWKHNLQGRI
SHUVRQZKRWDNHVDFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQMXVWWKLQNVRUFRPSODLQVDERXWDVLWXDWLRQ´. Both assessed 
the kind of open-minded, flexible thinking that should accompany decision-making competence 
(Baron, 1988; Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000). The other two were the Self-consciousness Scale, 
which assesses introspection and concern for how others view one, hence should reflect attention 
to social norms (HJ³,FDUHDORWabout how I present myself to others,´Fenigstein et al., 1975), 
and the Self-monitoring Scale, which asked about the tendency to monitor and critique RQH¶V
own behavior in social situations (HJ³There are many things I would only tell to a few of my 
friends,´Graziano et al., 1987; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Cantor, 1980). 
 Risk behavior. We focused on measures of risk and antisocial behavior that can incur 
significant physical, emotional, and societal costs. Psychiatric diagnoses that reflect disruptive 
and antisocial behaviors included Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Conduct Disorder up 
through age 16 (using a diagnostic instrument derived from Endicott & Spitzer, 1978; Spitzer, 
Williams, & Gibbon, 1987). Because respondents who miss a visit could return for future visits 
and the psychiatric interviews retrospectively covered the intervening time, we included all 
available data. Externalizing behavior (e.g., fighting, teasing) and delinquency (e.g., stealing, 
running away) were reported by the SDUWLFLSDQW¶VPRWKHUDWDJH, using the Child Behavior 
Checklist (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983). The number of times the respondent had had sexual 
intercourse and number of sexual partners were self-reported for the year prior to the age-16 
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assessment (using the natural logarithm of overall scores +1, to account for positive skewness). 
For self-reported alcohol and drug use, we followed &('$5¶V convention of using estimates 
derived from the Drug Use Screening Inventory (Kirisci, Tarter, & Tse-Chi, 1994; Tarter, 1990). 
At the age-16, age-19, and age-22 assessments, respondents reported their alcohol and drug use 
in a typical month, with the response options of 0, 1-2, 3-9, 10-20, and more than 20 times.      
Analytic approach  
Our analyses followed our three research aims. First, we used confirmatory factor 
analysis on the new CEDAR data for the Y-DMC expansion sample and A-DMC, to examine 
whether we could replicate sufficiency of fit for the single-factor model identified in exploratory 
factor analyses on previous data (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). 
Second, we examined the nomological validity of overall Y-DMC and A-DMC scores in terms 
of their correlations with the posited covariates, presenting results separately for the Y-DMC 
initial and expansion samples. Third, we compared Y-DMC and A-DMC scores for the 146 
participants who completed both tests, assessing the stability of decision-making competence 
over time, using zero-order and semi-partial correlations controlling for cognitive ability.  
Attrition analysis. The logistical challenges of longitudinal data collection led to varying 
amounts of missing data across variables. We used all available data, with the resulting sample 
sizes for nomological validity analyses (i.e., correlations) ranging from 89-108 for the Y-DMC 
initial sample, 334-416 for the Y-DMC expansion sample, 427-516 for the Y-DMC combined 
sample, and 176-214 for the A-DMC sample.6 Overall, 29.7% of CEDAR participants had at 
least one missing score. These individuals had slightly lower mean scores for Y-DMC (M=-.08, 
SD=.54 vs. M=.03, SD=.52, t(522)=2.30, p < .05) and A-DMC (M=-.07, SD=.61 vs. M=.03, 
SD=.51, t (144)=1.28, ns.).  
Decision-making competence  18 
The online supplementary material include additional task details, descriptive statistics, 
and correlations among the tasks.  
Results 
Aim 1: Assess the internal validity of Y-DMC and A-DMC, as revealed in the relationships 
among scores on their component tasks 
Y-DMC (Age 19). Table 3 presents a confirmatory factor analysis on the Y-DMC 
expansion sample, which revealed a good fit for a single overall factor. All Y-DMC tasks loaded 
significantly (p < .01), except for Resistance to Sunk Cost (which also had low internal 
consistency). The overall fit was similar when Resistance to Sunk Cost was removed from the 
PRGHO&), 506($ 6505Ȥ2(10)=19.3, p<.05). In order to maintain 
comparability to past studies, we kept Resistance to Sunk Cost in the composite measure. 
A-DMC (age 30). The confirmatory factor analysis for A-DMC also showed a good fit 
and yielded results similar to those with Y-DMC. The main exception is that Resistance to Sunk 
Cost loaded positively and significantly, which may reflect its improved measurement.  
Aim 2: Assess the nomological validity of Y-DMC and A-DMC, in terms of whether they 
correlate in expected ways with other constructs 
Y-DMC (Age 19). Table 4 shows significant zero-order Pearson correlations between 
overall Y-DMC score and both measures of cognitive ability, for the Y-DMC initial sample (as 
reported in Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), the Y-DMC expansion sample, and the combined sample. 
Table 4 shows that participants with higher Y-DMC scores also had more favorable social and 
family environments, as measured by the absence of paternal substance abuse, higher household 
socio-economic status, less neighborhood disadvantage, greater social support, and more positive 
peer environment.7 Higher Y-DMC scores were also correlated with self-report measures of 
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cognitive style plausibly related to better decision making. Participants with higher Y-DMC 
scores showed less of several problematic behavior tendencies, as measured by CEDAR staff 
(childhood antisocial disorders) and reported by the \RXWK¶VPRWKHUexternalizing behavior, 
delinquency). They self-reported more cannabis use, more sex, and more sexual partners. Y-
DMC scores showed little relationship to self-reported alcohol use. Generally speaking, these 
relationships were similar in the two samples. Controlling for the two measures of cognitive 
ability reduced these correlations, but many of the associations remain significant ± most notably 
neighborhood disadvantage, self-monitoring, and several risk behaviors. 
A-DMC (age 30). The fifth column of Table 4 shows correlations between A-DMC and 
the CEDAR covariates. Overall, they were very similar to those for Y-DMC, assessed eleven 
years earlier, with covariates from earlier CEDAR assessments. Perhaps the most notable 
difference was the weaker correlation with childhood antisocial disorders, assessed at age 16. A-
DMC was more strongly correlated with cannabis use self-reports collected closer in time to its 
assessment. Controlling for the two measures of cognitive ability had a similar effect with A-
DMC as with Y-DMC, leaving the signs unchanged, but taking most below the threshold of 
statistical significance. 
Aim 3: Assess the stability of decision-making competence over time and across assessment tools 
Overall Y-DMC scores at age 19 were strongly correlated with A-DMC scores at age 30 
(r=.50, p<.001), despite the 11-year time difference and the modest differences in the measures 
(with A-DMC drawing on Y-DMC results to improve its design). Controlling for cognitive 
ability reduces this correlation somewhat, but it remains strongly significant (r=.33, p<.001). 
There were also positive correlations for scores on corresponding versions of most of the six 
individual tasks: Resistance to Framing (r=.17, p<.05), Resistance to Sunk Cost (r=.18, p<.05), 
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Applying Decision Rules (r=.55, p<.001), Under/Overconfidence (r=-.03, ns.), 8 Consistency in 
Risk Perception (r=.07, ns.), and Recognizing Social Norms (r=.29, p<.01). As might be 
expected for subtasks involving fewer responses, these correlations were smaller than those for 
the overall decision-making competence score. Excluding the most highly correlated task, 
Applying Decision Rules, left overall scores that were still well correlated over time (r=.35, 
p<.001). 
Discussion 
We evaluated the robustness of decision-making competence using two instruments, Y-
DMC, designed for young adults, and A-DMC, designed for the general adult population. We 
reported new data from the CEDAR longitudinal study, adding 416 Y-DMC participants in its 
age-19 assessment, to our original 110 (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), and 214 A-DMC respondents 
in its age-30 assessment, for comparison with our original community sample (Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2007). These samples included 146 individuals who completed both Y-DMC at age 19 and 
A-DMC at age 30. Combined with the earlier studies, these new data allowed us to examine the 
robustness of the construct across samples and time.  
 Addressing Aim 1, responses of the Y-DMC expansion sample were similar to those of 
the original Y-DMC sample, in terms of the internal validity of the six tasks and the results of a 
confirmatory factor analysis. Responses of the CEDAR A-DMC sample were similar to those of 
the earlier community sample, in the same ways. The main difference between results with the 
two scales was that Resistance to Sunk Cost had a significant loading on the A-DMC factor, but 
not on the Y-DMC factor, presumably reflecting its improved measurement in A-DMC (more 
items, more response options per item).  
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Addressing Aim 2, patterns of nomological validity in both new samples paralleled those 
for the original samples. Participants with higher Y-DMC or A-DMC scores had greater 
cognitive abilities and more supportive family and social environments, which may promote the 
development of decision-making competence. They displayed more constructive cognitive 
styles, which may be expected to reflect concurrent skills. Finally, they reported fewer instances 
of what may be deemed (at least by some) health-risking and antisocial behavior, potentially 
reflective of poorer decision making. The pattern of these correlations remained, albeit in 
weakened form, after controlling for the two measures of cognitive ability, with some of the 
strongest residual correlations being neighborhood disadvantage, self-reported self-monitoring, 
and several risk behaviors. The correlations emerged despite the covariates being assessed from 
3 to 20 years before or after the DMC measures. 
Addressing Aim 3, overall Y-DMC scores at age 19 predicted overall A-DMC scores at 
age 30. This relationship remained after controlling for the two measures of cognitive ability. 
This stability occurred despite the Y-DMC and A-DMC assessments using somewhat different 
instruments. A-DMC sought to improve on Y-DMC by increasing the number of items per task 
and the number of response options per item. Those changes may account for the highest 
correlations across time being with the two tasks that were perhaps most similar, Applying 
Decision Rules and Recognizing Social Norms.  
Thus, the construct of decision-making competence captured in these two measures 
appears to be robust over samples and over time, while showing nomological validity in its 
correlations with other measures that are plausibly related to the ability to follow traditional 
normative principles. These results strengthen the case for the external validity of such tasks, 
when used in behavioral experiments. They also suggest the value of using DMC measures in 
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studies of decision making. Two topics for such research that emerge from the present results are 
how decision-making competence relates to other cognitive abilities and how social 
environments (family, neighborhood) and decision-making competence affect one another.9  
Limitations  
The longitudinal data collection conducted by CEDAR created a unique scientific 
resource that allowed us to examine decision-making competence over time and in the context of 
a rich suite of other relevant variables and outcomes. CEDAR had a remarkable retention rate 
(73%), considering the 11-year time span and demands on participants. If that attrition were non-
random, then it might bias our results in some way. However, we know of no specific concerns ± 
and are somewhat reassured by the similarities in results across samples and for participants with 
and without missing covariate data. 
To avoid capitalization on chance, we identified the correlates that we would consider in 
advance and report on all variables that we analyzed. We focused on major patterns, rather than 
small differences in results (especially given the small size of the Y-DMC initial sample). 
Nonetheless, our aims required many analyses, suggesting caution in interpreting results beyond 
the general patterns. 
Whereas the Y-DMC and A-DMC assessments were designed to assess the same 
underlying construct, the specifics of their component measures differ sufficiently so that we can 
only examine the stability of performance in relative terms (via correlations) and not its absolute 
level (i.e., are people better decision makers at 30 than at 19). A-DMC is a superior instrument 
overall, judging by its psychometric properties (although Cronbach¶V alpha for some tasks 
remains low). However, its items are designed for adults, whereas Y-DMC is designed for late 
adolescents. Both have content best suited for North American, English-speaking audiences, 
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which has prompted translations (Bavolar, 2013; Del Missier et al., 2012, 2013, 2015; Mäntylä et 
al., 2012), whose feasibility is supported by the construct validity of these two measures.  
The present analyses consider a unidimensional characterization of decision-making 
competence, as supported by past research and evaluated with CFA, but do not preclude the 
potential for multiple dimensions. The original Y-DMC and A-DMC studies reported 
exploratory factor-analytic solutions that extracted more than one factor, but these factors lacked 
clear interpretability, due to both the limited number of tasks and cross-loadings across factors. 
Examining the dimensionality of decision-making competence is an important challenge for 
future research, using a larger set of tasks tapping different skills. That research might also use 
Item Response Theory methods at the individual DMC scale level, in order to refine the 
measurement of component tasks. These methods, given an appropriate item pool, have the 
potential to create more efficient tests, both in terms of the range of ability levels measured and 
the length of the test.  
As mentioned, the performance standard for both assessments is adherence to traditional 
normative theories of decision making, for maximizing expected utility. These tasks do not 
address the question of individual differences in judicious use of heuristic processes, another 
topic for future research. 
Implications and Recommendations  
We interpret these results as evidence for the robustness of the decision-making 
competence construct and its component tasks, as captured in these two related measures. We 
believe that one contributor to this robustness is that those tasks build on ones developed in 
behavioral decision research experiments that have refined their format and presentation, while 
examining the effects of alternative formulations on behavior. That collective experience helped 
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us to create tasks that would be well understood and to situate each in the skills domain that it 
was meant to represent. A second plausible contributor is that the tasks assess performance, 
rather than self-reported behavior (Appelt et al., 2011). Although self-report and performance 
tasks often demonstrate convergent validity, perceived and actual performance can differ (e.g., 
Parker et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2012).   
Behavioral decision research has traditionally viewed decision making through a 
situational lens, examining how experimental manipulations evoke general cognitive processes. 
Our results suggest the feasibility and potential value of studying individual differences and their 
relationships to real-world antecedents, concomitants, and consequences. Moving forward, as a 
research community, we face the collective challenge of linking research in the lab and the 
ZRUOGDFURVVLQGLYLGXDOV¶OLYHV.  
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Footnotes 
1
 One of the seven Y-DMC tasks, which assessed adherence to the rational-choice axiom 
of path independence, lacked reliability and validity, hence was dropped from subsequent 
analyses. 
2
 As argued in Parker and Fischhoff (2005), these risk behaviors need not be irrational, if 
WKH\IROORZLQDQRUGHUO\IDVKLRQIURPDGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VEHOLHIVDQGYDOXHV However, they may 
reflect poor choices in a society that generally deems them unhealthy, antisocial, or even illegal ± 
an assertion supported by their negative correlation with Y-DMC. 
3
 Follow-up assessments are labelled according to their target ages: age 14 (age rage 11.3 
- 15.6, M = 13.4, SD = 0.9); age 16 (range 15.5 ± 17.7, M = 16.1, SD = 0.4); age 19 (range 17.7 
± 20.7; M = 18.9, SD = 0.5); age 22 (range = 20.8 ± 23.3, M = 21.9, SD = 0.4); age 25 (range 
24.6 ± 26.0; M = 24.9, SD = 0.3); age 28 (range = 27.6 ± 29.0, M = 27.9, SD = 0.3), and age 30 
(range = 29.6 ± 31.4, M = 30.0, SD = 0.4). 
4
 Parker and Fischhoff (2005) analyzed all available data, two of which were missing at 
least on task score. Here we consider only the 108 individuals with full Y-DMC data. 
5
 Y-DMC results were almost completely unaffected by restricting Y-DMC to only 
valence framing problems.  
6
 Exceptions: The self-monitoring scale was eliminated from the protocol in 2000, hence 
is available only for 127 participants in the Y-DMC expansion sample and 221 of the total Y-
DMC sample. Two covariates, alcohol and marijuana use, were measured at age 22, for which 
some respondents were not yet eligible. The sample sizes for these tests are 80 for the Y-DMC 
initial sample, 311 for the Y-DMC expansion sample, and 391 for the total Y-DMC sample. 
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7
 We previously reported a negative relationship between social support and Y-DMC 
(Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). In the course of the present analyses, we discovered a coding that 
had reversed the sign. The relationship is actually positive, as initially hypothesized. 
8
 Under/overconfidence is made up of two components: the percentage of the true-false 
questions that the participant got correct and their average confidence judgment. It is worth 
noting that these two components correlated strongly across the Y-DMC and A-DMC 
instruments (percent correct r = .45, p < .001; average confidence r=.54, p < .001). 
9
 From a measurement perspective, one psychometric issue surrounding DMC, and other 
broad measures (e.g., Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016), is whether the construct should be 
viewed as reflective (i.e., individual differences in a latent construct causes variation in the tasks 
used to represent it) or formative (i.e., the tasks define the construct) (Bagozzi, 2007; Edwards, 
2001). A case could be made for either perspective (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Stanovich et 
al., 2017). The DMC measures are formative for those who view decision-making competence as 
defined by the skills that the tasks represent. Such a definition guided our initial work, reflecting 
on the skill set that we saw as implicit in the research literature. That set had one omission, 
decision structuring, which did not lend itself to standardized testing and is also little studied, 
even though its importance is recognized. The measures are reflective for those who view 
decision-making competence as defined by a general capability, captured in different ways by 
different tasks. That position would be supported by the belief that these tasks should correlate 
with each other in a meaningful way (i.e., show structural validity), unlike those in formative 
measurement, where tasks are selected to represent different aspects of the construct 
independently. It would also be supported by the belief that individual tasks would correlate in 
similar ways with other constructs in a nomological network, whereas one would not necessarily 
Decision-making competence  37 
expect such results with a formative measure. Our results, in general, agree with these 
expectations, but somewhat modestly. Hence, if one is to consider this a reflective measure, it 
may cover a broad and diverse domain. We are grateful for the opportunity to administer our 
PHDVXUHVWR&('$5¶VLQWHQVHO\FKDUDFWHUL]HGVDPSOHVDQGH[DPLQHRXUFRQVWUXFWLQUHODWLRQWR
its history (with Y-DMC) and future (with A-DMC). We encourage other researchers to seek 
such collaborations. 
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Table 1. Decision-making competence tasks used for Y-DMC and A-DMC 
  
Task Performance Criterion 
Resistance to Framing Consistency in choice across equivalent, positively- and 
negatively-worded questions  
Resistance to Sunk Cost Considering only future consequences when making choices 
Applying Decision Rules Using specified decision rules in choosing among multi-
attribute options 
Under/overconfidence Correspondence between confidence and knowledge 
Consistency in Risk Perception Consistency between risk judgments and probability theory 
Recognizing Social Norms Correlation between judged and measured social norms 
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Table 2. Characteristics of the Y-DMC and A-DMC samples. 
Sample Characteristic 
Y-DMC  
Initial Sample  
(Age 19) 
Y-DMC  
Expansion Sample  
(Age 19) 
A-DMC  
Sample  
(Age 30) 
Sample size 108 416 214 
% Male 100.0% 56.0% 88.8% 
Age    
Age-19 assessment M = 18.6 
(SD = 0.6) 
18.9 
(SD = 0.4) 
M = 18.7 
(SD = 0.6) 
Age-30 assessment M = 30.1 
(SD = 0.4) 
M = 30.0 
(SD = 0.3) 
M = 30.1 
(SD = 0.4) 
% with high-school diploma or GED:    
Age-19 assessment 56.1% 81.6% 61.0% 
Age-30 assessment 95.8% 96.6% 96.2% 
% with EDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHRUJUHDWHU
age-30 assessment 
 
47.2% 
 
48.7% 
 
47.4% 
% Caucasian 86.1% 71.1% 79.1% 
% in High-risk Group 36.1% 45.2% 32.7% 
Note: Gender and race information is missing for eight Y-DMC respondents and three A-DMC 
respondents. Education information is missing for one Y-DMC and A-DMC respondent. 
Decision-making competence  40 
Table 3. Single-factor solutions for confirmatory factor analyses of Y-DMC and A-DMC 
task scores. 
Task  
Y-DMC  
(Expansion Sample Only)  A-DMC 
Resistance to Framing  .30** (.07) .40** (.09) 
Resistance to Sunk Cost  -.09 (.07) .31** (.08) 
Applying Decision Rules  .75** (.09) .84** (.17) 
Under/overconfidence  .49** (.09) .17* (.09) 
Consistency in Risk Perception  .36** (.08) .36** (.11) 
Recognizing Social Norms  .40** (.07) .27** (.09) 
CFI  .953 1.00 
RMSEA  .046 .000 
SRMR  .034 .026 
Ȥ2 (df)  16.93* (9) 4.90 (9) 
Note. Standardized estimates presented; standard errors for parameter estimates in parentheses. ** 
p<.01. * p<.05.  
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Table 4. Correlations of Y-DMC and A-DMC with covariate measures. 
 
Y-DMC, pairwised 
Y-DMC, 
controlling 
for 
cognitive 
ability 
 
A-DMCe 
A-DMC, 
controlling 
for 
cognitive 
ability  Initial Expansion Combined Combined 
Sample Size 108 416 524 516 214 211 
Cognitive Ability       
ECFa .39*** .42*** .43*** n/a .30*** n/a 
Vocabulary (WISC-R)a .46*** .46*** .47*** n/a .46*** n/a 
Social and Family Influences       
Paternal substance use (yes=1; no=0)a -.37*** -.14** -.19*** -.08* -.20** -.05 
Household Socio-Economic Statusa .35*** .29*** .30*** .09* .31*** .05 
Neighborhood disadvantagea -.32*** -.43*** -.42*** -.21*** -.42*** -.17** 
Social supportc .31** .15** .18*** .07 .30*** .12* 
Positive peer environmentc .30** .13* .16*** .05 .19* .08 
Cognitive Style       
Polarized thinkingc -.30** -.30*** -.28*** -.09* -.28*** -.12* 
Self-consciousnessb .25* .09+ .12** .10* .05 .07 
Self-monitoringc .20+ .22* .19** .21*** -.03 -.01 
Behavioral copingc .25* .12* .14** .01 .26*** .09 
Risk Behavior       
Childhood antisocial disorders c -.23* -.22*** -.20** -.08* -.05 .03 
Externalizing behaviorb -.29** -.21*** -.23*** -.09* -.19* -.11 
Delinquencyb -.24* -.34*** -.33*** -.14** -.20** -.05 
Ln(# of alcohol uses, typical month)       
Age-16 assessment -.11 -.11* -.10* -.07 .02 .01 
Age-19 assessment -.16 -.03 -.05 -.03 -.16* -.11 
Age-22 assessment -.01 .13* .10* .06 .08 .05 
Ln(# of cannabis uses, typical month)       
Age-16 assessment -.21* -.19*** -.18*** -.12** .00 .00 
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Age-19 assessment -.11 -.24*** -.21*** -.12** -.18* -.08 
Age-22 assessment -.15 -.16** -.15** -.07 -.25** -.13 
Ln(# times had sex, last year)c -.19+ -.28*** -.26*** -.14*** -.24*** -.09 
Ln(# sexual partners)c -.26* -.29*** -.29*** -.16*** -.31*** -.15* 
Note:  Columns 4 and 6 present semipartial correlations, controlling for cognitive ability.  Change in R2 is the square of these 
semipartial coefficients, and ranges from .00 to .05 for Y-DMC and .00 to .03 for A-DMC. 
*** p< .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; + p < .10. 
a
 Measured at baseline assessment; b Measured at age-14 assessment; c Measured at age-16 assessment; d Measured at age-19 
assessment; e Measured at age-30 assessment. 
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The Robustness of Decision-Making Competence 
Supplementary Material 
This supplementary material contains additional detail regarding the method and results reported 
in the main manuscript.  In particular, it contains sample items for each of the Y-DMC tasks 
(with notes on how A-DMC differs), descriptive statistics for each Y-DMC and A-DMC 
component measure and composite scores, and correlations among the DMC component 
measures.   
Task Details and Sample items 
Resistance to Framing   
Positively- and negatively-framed items are fielded within-subject, but separated by other 
Y-DMC instruments to reduce memory effects.  Resistance to Framing item pairs ask 
respondents to (a) choose or reject one of two flavors of ice cream, one that tastes good and the 
other that tastes great but is really bad for you, where consistency means choosing one and 
rejecting the other (Shafir, 1993); (b) judge whether a condom is acceptable when its efficacy is 
described by its success or failure rate (adapted from Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff, 1993); (c) 
choose between a smaller, more immediate payoff ($100) and a larger ($120), more delayed one 
(adapted from Roelofsma & Keren, 1995); (d) choose between medical treatments described as 
lives saved or lives lost (Tversky & Kahneman, 1988); and (e) choose between a gamble with 
negative consequences and an expenditure described as a sure loss or an insurance payment 
(Fischhoff, 1993).  Items from each pair are separated by other Y-DMC tasks.  The Resistance to 
Framing score is the number of consistent choices (0-5).   
The following are verbatim items from Y-DMC, which includes five item pairs.   
Problem 2 (negative frame): 
Imagine that a type of condom has a 5% failure rate.  That is, if you have sex with 
someone who has the AIDS virus, there is a 5% chance that this type of condom will fail 
to prevent you from being exposed to the AIDS virus. 
Should the government allow this type of condom to be advertised as "an effective 
method for lowering the risk of AIDS?"   Yes No 
Problem 2 (positive frame): 
Imagine that a type of condom has a 95% success rate.  That is, if you have sex with 
someone who has the AIDS virus, there is a 95% chance that this type of condom will 
prevent you from being exposed to the AIDS virus. 
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Should the government allow this type of condom to be advertised as "an effective 
method for lowering the risk of AIDS?"   Yes No  
A-DMC uses this pair and thirteen others.  Seven pairs frame attributes in positive or 
QHJDWLYHWHUPVHJJURXQGEHHIGHVFULEHGDV³OHDQ´RU³IDW´DQGVHYHQGHVFULEHULVN\
choices in terms of gains or losses HJGHVFULEHGLQWHUPVRI³OLYHVVDYHG´RU³OLYHVORVW´.  A-
DMC uses a 6-point itemized-rating response scale. 
Resistance to Sunk Cost  
The following item is one of two from Y-DMC. 
You and your friend have driven half way to a resort.  To get a lower price, you have put 
down a $100 deposit for the weekend there.  Even if you cancel, you cannot get the $100 
back.  Both you and your friend feel sick.  You both feel that you both would have a 
much better weekend at home.  Your friend says it is "too bad" you have paid the deposit 
because you both would much rather spend the time at home, but you can't afford to 
waste $100.  You agree.  Do you drive on or turn back?  
  Drive on  Turn back 
A-DMC uses this and nine others.  Items address varied contexts, some adapted from the 
sunk-cost literature (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Baron, Granato, Spranca, & Teubal, 1993; 
Bornstein & Chapman, 1995; Frisch, 1993), and others created by the authors (Bruine de Bruin 
et al., 2007). Higher average ratings, across the 10 items, reflect greater resistance to sunk costs.  
A-DMC uses a 6-point itemized-rating response scale. 
Applying Decision rules 
 The following item is from Y-DMC, which includes seven items. 
 
 
Bobby has decided to use the following rule.  He throws out any Walkman that is below 
medium in his most important feature, Tape Player Sound.  He then throws out any Walkman 
worse than medium in his next most important feature, Comfort of Headphones. 
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A-DMC uses ten very similar questions, but displays are numeric (rather than graphical), 
the choices include more options (to increase difficulty), and choices are among Blu-ray players. 
Note that our original A-DMC (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) used DVD players, but the 
technology was updated to Blu-ray players for this study. Our original Y-DMC analysis (Parker 
& Fischhoff, 2005) used a count to compute performance, but a percentage is used here to 
increase comparability to A-DMC. 
Under/overconfidence 
The following are items from Y-DMC, which includes 42 items, grouped into general 
knowledge, knowledge about alcohol and drugs, and knowledge about sex and HIV/AIDS.  
$URELQ¶VHJJVDUHRUDQJH 
This statement is [True / False ]. 
 
 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 just guessing     absolutely sure 
Snorting cocaine can cause lung cancer. 
This statement is [True / False ]. 
 
 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 just guessing     absolutely sure 
A man can get the AIDS virus (HIV) from having sex with a woman who has it. 
This statement is [True / False ]. 
  
 50% 60%      70% 80% 90% 100% 
 just guessing     absolutely sure 
A-DMC uses a similar format, but includes 34 items on a broad range of life topics. 
Consistency in Risk Perception 
Y-DMC includes five sets of items compared for consistency.  Item pairs include nested 
subset and superset events, for which the former should be judged as less likely (e.g., an event 
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occurring in the next year vs. the next five years; dying in a terrorist attack vs. dying from any 
cause), complementary events, for which the judged likelihood should add up to 100% (e.g., 
getting into a car accident while driving vs. being accident free), conjunctions of two events, 
which should be judged as no more likely than either of the constituent events (getting drunk and 
having sex vs. either occurring alone), and disjunctions of two events, which should be judged as 
no less likely than each constituent event (using cannabis or another illegal drug vs. either 
occurring alone). Each set is scored as whether or not the responses are consistent with the rules 
of probability theory.  The pair below is coded as an error if the judged likelihood of arrest by 
age 30 is less than the judged likelihood of arrest in the next year. 
The following is one of the five Y-DMC item pairs. 
What is the percent chance that you will be arrested, whether rightly or wrongly, at least 
once in the next year? 
0% 
0% 
100%
100%
no chance certainty
5%
10%
15%
20%
25% 35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70% 80%
85%
90%
95%75%
30%
 
What is the percent chance that you will be arrested, whether rightly or wrongly, at least 
once between now and when you turn 30? 
0% 
0% 
100%
100%
no chance certainty
5%
10%
15%
20%
25% 35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70% 80%
85%
90%
95%75%
30%
 
A-DMC follows a similar format, but includes 20 consistency comparisons, using time 
frames of in the next year and the next five years.  Our original Y-DMC analysis (Parker & 
Fischhoff, 2005) used a count, but a percentage is used here to increase comparability to A-
DMC. 
Recognizing Social Norms 
The Y-DMC and A-DMC tasks are identical for Recognizing Social Norms.  The task 
LQFOXGHVTXHVWLRQVDVNLQJZKHWKHUHDFKRIQHJDWLYHEHKDYLRUVLV³VRPHWLPHV2.´\HVQR
DQGTXHVWLRQVDVNLQJZKDWSURSRUWLRQRI³SHRSOH\RXUDJH´ZRXOGVD\WKDWHDFKEHKDYLRr is 
sometimes OK (0 to 100).  Sample averages from the first set are compared to the judged 
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percentages from the second set, with the rank-order correlation being the task score.  Below are 
examples from each set. 
'R\RXWKLQNLWLVVRPHWLPHV2.« 
   «WR steal under certain circumstances? 
    Yes  No 
2XWRISHRSOH\RXUDJHKRZPDQ\ZRXOGVD\LWLVVRPHWLPHV2.« 
   «WRVWHDOXQGHUFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHV" 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No one         Everyone 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) used age EUDFNHWVWRDFFRXQWIRU³SHRSOH\RXUDJH´ZKHQ
computing the norm for our adult sample.  Adult participants in this study all received Y-DMC at 
age 19 and A-DMC at age 30, making such bracketing unnecessary. 
Additional Results 
Table S1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the Y-DMC component task scores.   
Table S1.  Descriptive statistics for Y-DMC 
Score N Range (potential) 
Mean  
(SD) 
Median  
(IQR) 
Resistance to Framing 529 0-5 
(0-5) 
3.4 
(1.08) 
3 
(3-4) 
Resistance to Sunk Cost 530 0-2 
(0-2) 
.7 
(.70) 
1 
(0-1) 
Applying Decision Rules 528 .29-1.00 
(.00-1.00) 
.89 
(.17) 
1.00 
(.86-1.00) 
Under/overconfidence 532 .59-1.00 
(.00-1.00) 
.92 
(.07) 
.94 
(.89 - .97) 
Consistency in Risk Perception 530 .00-1.00 
(.00-1.00) 
.83 
(.20) 
.80 
(.80-1.00) 
Recognizing Social Norms 524 -.34 - .89  
(-1.00 - 1.00) 
.52 
(.22) 
.55 
(.40 - .67) 
 
 
7DEOH6SUHVHQWVWKH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVIRU<-DMC by sample. 
7DEOH6&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDRIWKH<-DMC task scores across samples. 
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Task 
Y-DMC Initial 
Samplea 
Y-DMC Expansion 
Sample 
Y-DMC Total 
Sample 
Resistance to Framing .30 .19 .22 
Resistance to Sunk Cost .07 .13 .12 
Applying Decision Rules .68 .58 .60 
Under/overconfidence .79 .76 .77 
Consistency in Risk 
Perception 
.50 .45 .46 
Recognizing Social Norms .40 .68 .65 
Y-DMC Composite .73 .77 .76 
a
 Estimates only include respondents with full Y-DMC data, hence are slightly different from 
those reported in Parker & Fischhoff (2005), which used all available data. 
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Table S3 presents the Pearson correlations among the six Y-DMC component task scores.  
Overall, the mean correlation was .13. 
Table S3.  Correlations among Y-DMC task measures 
 Framing Sunk Cost Decision 
Rules 
Under/ 
overconfidence 
Risk 
Perception 
Resistance to Framing      
Resistance to Sunk Cost .04     
Applying Decision 
Rules 
.21*** -.06    
Under/overconfidence .23*** -.01 .35***   
Consistency in Risk 
Perception 
.18*** .03 .22*** .23***  
Recognizing Social 
Norms 
.09* -.03 .28*** .12** .11* 
*** two-sided p-value < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; + p < .10. 
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Table S5 provides descriptive statistics for each of the A-DMC component task scores. 
Table S5.  Descriptive statistics for A-DMC 
Score N Range (potential) 
Mean  
(SD) 
Median  
(IQR) 
Resistance to Framing 214 1.5 - 5.0 
(1.0 - 5.0) 
4.1 
(.5) 
4.2 
(3.8 ± 4.5) 
Resistance to Sunk Cost 214 2.1 ± 6.0 
(1.0 ± 6.0) 
4.2 
(.7) 
4.2 
(3.8 ± 4.6) 
Applying Decision Rules 214 0 ± 10 
(0 ± 10) 
6.2 
(2.1) 
7 
(5 ± 8) 
Under/overconfidence 214 .72 ± 1.00 
(.00 ± 1.00) 
.92 
(.06) 
.94 
(.89 - .97) 
Consistency in Risk Perception 214 7 ± 20 
(0 ± 20) 
15.4 
(2.6) 
16 
(14 ± 17) 
Recognizing Social Norms 214 -.20 - .88 
(-1.00 ± 1.00) 
.49 
(.23) 
.52 
(.34 - .67) 
 
Table S6 compares the CEDAR A-'0&&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDVZLWKWKRVHREVHUYHGE\
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) using a community sample of adults, age 18-88. 
Table S6&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDRIWKH<-DMC task scores across samples. 
Task CEDAR A-DMC Sample A-DMC Community Samplea 
Resistance to Framing .70 .62 
Resistance to Sunk Cost .55 .54 
Applying Decision Rules .67 .73 
Under/overconfidence .80 .77 
Consistency in Risk Perception .65 .72 
Recognizing Social Norms .57 .64 
Y-DMC Composite .81 .83 
a From Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007). 
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Table S7 presents the Pearson correlations among the six Y-DMC component task scores.  
Overall, the mean correlation was .15. 
Table S7.  Correlations among A-DMC task measures 
 Framing Sunk 
Cost 
Decision 
Rules 
Under/ 
overconfidence 
Risk 
Perception 
Resistance to Framing      
Resistance to Sunk 
Cost 
.09     
Applying Decision 
Rules 
.35*** .26**    
Under/overconfidence .03 .05 .15*   
Consistency in Risk 
Perception 
.11+ .15* .28*** .06  
Recognizing Social 
Norms 
.06 .06 .22** .09 .22** 
*** two-sided p-value < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; + p < .10. 
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Table S9 presents the Pearson correlations between each of the Y-DMC component task scores and each of the A-DMC 
component task scores. 
Table S9.  Correlations between Y-DMC and A-DMC task and composite measures 
 A-DMC 
Y-DMC 
Framing 
Sunk 
Cost 
Decision 
Rules 
Under/  
overconfidence 
Risk 
Perception 
Social 
Norms A-DMC 
Resistance to Framing .17* .23** .22** .00 .10 .02 .23** 
Resistance to Sunk Cost .02 .17* .05 .09 .00 -.02 .10 
Applying Decision Rules .24** .14+ .55*** .12 .14 .24** .45*** 
Under/overconfidence .27** .09 .21* -.02 .04 .00 .18* 
Consistency in Risk 
Perception 
.01 .12 .21* .07 .08 .15+ .19* 
Recognizing Social Norms .14 .12 .19* .04 .26** .29*** .33*** 
Y-DMC .28*** .29*** .48*** .10 .20* .23** .50*** 
*** two-sided p-value < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; + p < .10. 
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